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THE IMMIGRATION PARADOX:
ALIEN WORKERS AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
HOWARD F. CHANG
ABSTRACT
The immigration of relatively unskilled workers poses a fundamental
problem for liberals.  While from the perspective of the economic welfare of
natives, the optimal policy would be to admit these aliens as guest workers,
this policy would violate liberal ideals.  These ideals would treat these workers
as equals, entitled to access to citizenship and to the full set of public benefits
provided to citizens.  If the welfare of incumbent residents determines
admissions policies, however, and we anticipate the fiscal burden that the
immigration of the poor would impose, then our welfare criterion would
preclude the admission of relatively unskilled workers in the first place.  Thus,
our commitment to treat these workers as equals once admitted would cut
against their admission and make them worse off than they would be if we
agreed never to treat them as equals.
A liberal can avoid this “immigration paradox” by adopting a
cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern to all individuals,
including prospective immigrants and other aliens, which suggests liberal
immigration policies for relatively unskilled workers.  I argue that liberal
ideals require a global view of distributive justice and that attempts to defend
more limited conceptions of distributive justice that apply only within nations
are ultimately question-begging.  The problem with policy prescriptions based
on global justice is the failure of most citizens to adopt such a cosmopolitan
perspective.  As long as citizens are reluctant to bear the fiscal burdens that
cosmopolitan liberalism would impose, constraints of political feasibility may
imply that guest-worker programs are the best policies that cosmopolitan
liberals can obtain with respect to many aliens.
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THE IMMIGRATION PARADOX:
ALIEN WORKERS AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
HOWARD F. CHANG*
 With the number of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States
estimated to be about 12 million, accounting for four percent of our total
population, and growing at a rate of more than 500,000 per year,1 it seems
apparent that we need immigration reform.  The country, however, is bitterly
divided over what we must do.  For those who advocate comprehensive
immigration reform, the changes in our immigration laws must include
expanded opportunities for relatively unskilled alien workers to gain legal
access to our labor markets.
President George W. Bush proposed a large-scale guest-worker program
that would not only allow unauthorized immigrants to legalize their status as
guest workers but also attempt to satisfy the large and persistent demand for
relatively unskilled labor in the United States that attracts so many
unauthorized immigrants.  The Senate passed a comprehensive immigration
reform bill in 2006 that would establish such a guest-worker program and also
expand opportunities for legal immigration and permanent residence.  After
the failure of the House of Representatives to pass that bill, the Senate
considered another comprehensive immigration reform bill in 2007 that would
have created such a guest-worker program.  Thus, recent reform proposals
debated in Congress would have brought large numbers of relatively unskilled
alien workers into the United States on non-immigrant visas rather than on
immigrant visas.
I argue in this paper that the immigration of relatively unskilled workers
poses a fundamental problem for liberals.  While from the perspective of the
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economic welfare of natives, the optimal policy would be to admit these aliens
as guest workers, as I explain In Part I of this paper, this policy would also
violate liberal ideals.  These ideals would treat these workers as equals,
entitled to access to citizenship and to the full set of public benefits provided
to citizens.  If the welfare of incumbent residents determines admissions
policies, however, and we anticipate the fiscal burden that the immigration of
the poor would impose, then our welfare criterion would preclude the
admission of relatively unskilled workers in the first place.  Thus, our
commitment to treat these workers as equals once admitted would cut against
their admission and make them worse off than they would be if we agreed
never to treat them as equals. 
In Part II, I outline how a liberal can avoid this “immigration paradox” by
adopting a cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern to all
individuals, including prospective immigrants and other aliens.  This
cosmopolitan perspective suggests liberal immigration policies for relatively
unskilled workers.  I argue that the liberal ideals espoused by countries like
the United States require a global view of distributive justice, and I respond to
some of the alternative conceptions advanced by critics of this cosmopolitan
perspective.  Finally, in Part III, I conclude with normative implications for
immigration reforms in liberal states given the constraints of political
feasibility.
I.  THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATIVELY UNSKILLED ALIEN WORKER
First, I will suggest that if we concern ourselves only with the economic
welfare of natives, then the optimal policy with respect to relatively unskilled
alien workers would be to admit them as guest workers only.  Furthermore, if
we seek not only to maximize real income for natives but also to seek an
equitable income distribution among natives, then we have an even greater
interest in denying these workers access to public benefits and to citizenship.
Second, however, I note that once we introduce considerations of justice, the
exclusion of these aliens from the benefits of full membership in our society
becomes troubling, in light of the claims that aliens could make under liberal
theories of justice.  Third, I argue that if such a theory of distributive justice
fails to give the welfare of aliens the same consideration in the formulation of
admissions policies, then this notion of justice proves to be hollow, because it
implies that it would be best to exclude the alien from our territory.  This
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  3 See id. at 334.
  4 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2000).
  5 Id. § 1427(a).
result would be perverse from the perspective of the alien excluded, the
supposed beneficiary of the proposed obligations of distributive justice.
A.  The Welfare of Natives
From the perspective of the economic interests of natives, guest-worker
programs may be an optimal response to concerns regarding the impact of
relatively unskilled alien workers on the public treasury.  Natives of a host
country, taken together, will gain from the entry of alien workers in the labor
market.2  In the case of relatively unskilled alien workers, however, the cost
that they impose on the public treasury may outweigh the economic benefits
that natives derive from these workers in the labor market.  Empirical
evidence suggests that relatively unskilled immigrants on average have a net
negative fiscal impact on natives in the United States.  The National Research
Council (NRC), for example, found in 1996 that the average immigrant with
less than a high-school education imposed a net fiscal cost of $13,000, even
after taking into account the fiscal benefits that the immigrant’s descendants
would confer in the future.3
Through guest-worker programs, natives can enjoy the gains from trade
with these workers in the labor market without bearing the fiscal burden of
providing the full set of public benefits that these workers would receive if
they had access to permanent residence and, ultimately, citizenship.  In the
United States, we generally exclude not only unauthorized immigrants but also
non-immigrants, including temporary workers, from a broad range of public
benefits.  With only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for “any
Federal public benefit.”4  Although immigrants can gain full access to public
benefits upon naturalization, only aliens “admitted for permanent residence”
may naturalize as U.S. citizens.5  Aliens admitted on non-immigrant visas
only, including temporary guest workers, are not admitted as permanent
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Wages, Employment and Growth, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 23, 42; NRC, supra note
2, at 223.  For a survey of some of the recent empirical evidence on this question, see Howard
F. Chang, The Economic Impact of International Labor Migration: Recent Estimates and
Policy Implications, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321 (2007).
  8 Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal argue that the immigration of
relatively unskilled aliens into the United States in recent decades may help explain the failure
of the United States to adopt policies to curtail the growth in income inequality during this
period.  See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA:  THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 117-38 (2006).  This immigration
would have such an effect, they suggest, not only by moving citizens (and thus the median
residents and are thus not eligible for most public entitlements and not eligible
to naturalize.
The exclusion of alien workers from these programs leaves the host
country free to use these programs to transfer income among natives without
also shifting wealth to aliens in the process.  This freedom may be especially
important if host countries rely on such programs to address any adverse
effects that the entry of alien workers may have on the distribution of income
among natives.  In particular, some economists claim that immigration has had
a significant adverse impact on the least skilled native workers.6  Estimates of
the impact of immigration on native workers in the United States, however,
indicate that only the least skilled native workers suffer adverse effects and
that these effects are small.7  In any event, even if present levels of
immigration have little effect on the wages of the least skilled natives, a more
liberal immigration policy might produce more significant effects, especially if
relatively unskilled workers were to make up an increasingly large fraction of
the flow of immigrants.  Thus, the exclusion of alien workers from transfer
programs permits a host country to adopt more liberal admissions policies
without an adverse effect on either the public treasury or the distribution of
income among natives.  If instead the host country could not exclude these
aliens from these programs, then the fiscal burden of liberal admissions
policies would jeopardize the political support either for liberal admissions
polices or for the amount of redistribution effected by those transfer
programs.8  Because guest-worker programs can give relatively unskilled
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voter) up the income distribution but also because voters are “less eager to redistribute if that
redistribution has to be shared with the noncitizen poor.”  Id. at 138.
  9 Empirical evidence indicates that immigrant access to public assistance generates
significant political opposition to immigration.  See GORDON H. HANSON, WHY DOES
IMMIGRATION DIVIDE AMERICA?  PUBLIC FINANCE AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO OPEN
BORDERS (2005); Gordon H. Hanson, Kenneth Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, Public
Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies, 19 ECON. & POL. 1 (2007).
  10 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 60 (1983).
  11 Id. at 61.
  12 Id. at 52.
  13 Id. at 58.
  14 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
aliens access to our labor markets without necessarily providing full access to
the benefits provided to citizens, these programs may allow the most liberal
admissions policies possible for these aliens.9
B.  Justice and Social Cooperation
Critics of guest-worker programs commonly object that these programs
violate principles of justice.  The communitarian political theorist Michael
Walzer, for example, argues that the disenfranchisement of guest workers
violates the “principle of political justice” in a “democratic state.”10  “Political
justice is a bar to permanent alienage” for guest workers, according to Walzer,
“either for particular individuals or for a class of changing individuals.”11
Walzer claims that a society that relies on guest workers to meet its labor
needs is “a little tyranny,”12 in which  guest workers “are ruled ... by a band of
citizen-tyrants.”13
We might derive a similar conclusion from the liberal theory of justice
developed by John Rawls, who asks what principles individuals would choose
behind a “veil of ignorance.”14  In this “original position,” individuals know
nothing about their own personal circumstances or traits and thus “they do not
know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and
they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general
6 HOWARD F. CHANG
  15 Id. at 136-37.
  16 Id. at 141.
  17 Id. at 4.
  18 Id. at 75-80.
  19 Id. at 457.
  20 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 39 (1999); WALZER, supra note 10, at 35-48.
considerations.”15  This condition ensures that the parties are “fairly situated
and treated equally as moral persons,” because “a knowledge of particulars”
would produce an “outcome ... biased by arbitrary contingencies.”16  Rawls
includes all persons within a single “society,” which he describes as “a
cooperative venture for mutual advantage,” as participants in the original
position.17  Rawls concludes that principles of distributive justice would
require members of this society to maximize the welfare of those who are least
advantaged.18
A liberal might conclude that our obligations of distributive justice extend
to all workers who participate in a scheme of social cooperation with us.
From this perspective, we cannot limit these obligations to natives alone.  This
perspective suggests that if we admit workers to our labor market, we must
extend the benefits of full membership to them as well.  From this perspective,
by admitting relatively unskilled alien workers, we make them objects of our
concern and thus worthy recipients of the full set of public benefits that we
provide to natives.  We would then take a broader view of national economic
welfare:  our welfare objectives would include the welfare of not only natives
but also guest workers.  From this perspective, we must treat guest workers as
equals, providing them the access to citizenship that those admitted as
immigrants would enjoy.
By the same token, however, by excluding aliens from our labor market
and our society, we can avoid the obligations that we would incur by
admitting them.  Rawls assumes that the “boundaries” of his principles of
justice “are given by the notion of a self-contained national community.”19  In
fact, both Rawls and Walzer defend the right of a nation to exclude
prospective immigrants free of the obligations of justice that would apply
among members of the national community.20
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C.  The Immigration Paradox
This view of justice, however, produces an anomaly.  If our admission
policies are based on the welfare of natives and immigrants already here, then
we would refuse to admit poor immigrants because we would anticipate the
public benefits that they would consume and the fiscal burden that they would
impose on incumbent residents.  Thus, our commitment to treat them as equals
once admitted would cut against their admission and make them worse off
than they would be if we rejected such a commitment.  That is, by agreeing to
obligations of distributive justice toward them if admitted, we harm them.  Our
promise of justice and equality for these aliens proves to be hollow.  These
aliens would be better off if we agreed never to care about their welfare and
never to treat them as equals.
If concern for the welfare of poor immigrants motivates generous fiscal
policies toward them, then it seems perverse to cite these policies as a reason
to exclude the very immigrants whose welfare we would seek to improve
through these policies.  This moral stance is unsatisfactory from the standpoint
of human welfare.  The liberal who prevents a poor alien from escaping
poverty while citing principles of justice and equality for that alien seems
vulnerable to the charge of “superstitious ‘rule worship,’” that is, “the charge
of heartlessness, in his apparently preferring abstract conformity to a rule to
the prevention of avoidable human suffering.”21  If we pursue such a perverse
notion of justice, without serving the welfare of those on whose behalf we
would invoke its principles, then our concern for equality among the
inhabitants of our country looks more like a fetish than the product of a
coherent theory of justice.
It seems incoherent public policy to turn away the poor immigrant, citing a
negative effect on the welfare of current residents, given that we always have
the option of admitting the poor immigrant subject to restrictions on access to
public benefits and to citizenship.  This option would improve the welfare of
both the poor immigrant and the welfare of current residents.  This admission
would also transform the poor immigrant into a resident, however, and if our
social welfare criterion includes the welfare of all residents, then the same
distributive concerns that justified generous policies for other poor residents
would apply to the poor immigrant as well.  In short, no measure of social
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welfare that counts an individual’s welfare if and only if the individual is a
resident can provide a coherent criterion for immigration policies, because
these policies determine the identity of the population of residents.
This moral stance harms the very individuals whose welfare we would
invoke as the basis for their access to citizenship and public benefits.  This
paradox lies at the heart of immigration policy.  A commitment to treat the
immigrant as an equal can backfire against the alien seeking to immigrate,
because the immigrant’s access to equal status does not arise unless we admit
the immigrant.  If the act of admission triggers obligations of justice, then we
can avoid these obligations by choosing to exclude.  Indeed, if admission
polices are determined by the welfare of incumbent residents, then we would
be obliged to exclude relatively unskilled alien workers.  This stance begs the
question of whether we can legitimately base admission policies on the
interests of incumbent residents alone.
Unless the admission decision itself also respects the alien as an equal, the
result is perverse.  Thus, the source of the immigration paradox is the
contingent nature of the obligation to treat the alien as an equal.  That is, this
problem is inherent in making obligations of justice contingent on voluntary
acts of cooperation.  If we refuse to admit alien workers, then we owe them no
explanation within the framework that Rawls proposes for deriving principles
of justice.  This approach reconciles the exclusion of aliens with egalitarian
principles of social justice only by fiat:  it assumes the result rather than
deriving it.
We cannot begin our normative analysis by assuming that we do not admit
the aliens in question.  As the example of immigration policy demonstrates,
the question of which individuals we choose as partners in cooperation is itself
an open question of public policy that we may want to answer using our
principles of justice.  If we make obligations of justice contingent on whether
we admit them in the first place, then this normative framework becomes a
function of our admissions policies and cannot work as an independent
standard that we can use to evaluate these policies.
That is, if admission to our labor market implies status as a constituent and
as a member of our society, then the set of individuals whose welfare we seek
to promote becomes endogenous.  By choosing our members, we also choose
our moral obligations and our welfare objectives.  If our obligations depend on
our admission policies, however, then our analysis becomes circular:  we are
justified in discriminating against aliens in employment precisely because our
refusal to hire them relieves us of the obligations of justice that we would owe
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equals.  Such a theory begs the question of whether our choice of partners is
itself justifiable.
This immigration paradox is quite general:  the problem arises regardless
of what act of admission we deem sufficient to trigger the alien’s claim to
justice.  For example, if admission to our labor market triggers this claim, then
we have a reason to exclude relatively unskilled aliens from our labor market,
even if they seek to work only temporarily as guest workers.  This approach
allows us to avoid obligations of justice by refusing to employ these aliens,
even if these aliens would be better off as guest workers with no claim to
distributive justice.
If instead it is admission to permanent residence that triggers the alien’s
claim to justice, then we have a reason to prevent poor aliens from residing
permanently within our borders.  We might admit guest workers on a strictly
temporary basis, for example, and invest significant resources in efforts to
ensure that these workers depart at the end of their authorized stay.  Again, we
avoid the burdens that obligations of distributive justice would impose on us,
but only by expelling aliens who may be better off if allowed to enjoy access
to our labor market for a more extended period of time, even without access to
public benefits or citizenship.
The immigration paradox arises even if de facto permanent residence is
sufficient to trigger claims of justice.  If unauthorized immigrants have claims
to justice based on long-term residence, for example, then these claims do not
derive from formal admission as a legal immigrant.  Nevertheless, such claims
would generate a reason for host countries to exclude, to hunt down, and to
deport such immigrants before they can acquire the rights of a long-term
resident.  Thus, even unauthorized immigrants may be better off if we rejected
notions of justice granting their claims to legal permanent residence or to
public benefits, because we might then tolerate their presence more readily
and invest fewer scarce resources in draconian efforts to drive them out.
II.  GLOBAL DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND ITS CRITICS
To avoid the immigration paradox, we need a normative criterion that is
independent of our immigration policies and thus avoids the circularity that
underlies the immigration paradox.  A cosmopolitan theory of distributive
justice that extends equal concern to all individuals, including aliens,
regardless of their immigration status, could provide such a solution by
10 HOWARD F. CHANG
  22 See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 143-53
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Charles Sabel, Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 147, 164-75 (2006).
  26 Andrea Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3,
7 (2007).
granting all persons the same claim to distributive justice.  Some cosmopolitan
theorists argue that a world in which nations engage in international trade in
goods, services, capital, and labor is a “cooperative venture for mutual
advantage” sufficient to trigger Rawlsian obligations of distributive justice
worldwide.  In light of this international cooperation, Charles Beitz and others
have argued that the entire world is a “society” in which all individuals would
be parties to the original position.22  Beitz suggests that “we should not view
national boundaries as having fundamental moral significance” and that
“principles of justice” should “therefore apply globally.”23
Others, however, dispute the claim that the world is a “cooperative venture
for mutual advantage” within the meaning of the theory of justice developed
by Rawls.24  For critics of the cosmopolitan perspective, the obligations of
distributive justice among residents of one nation are more extensive than
those that apply across national borders.  Thus, for those who stress
cooperation as the basis for obligations of distributive justice, “the salience of
global justice is increasing in the density of interactions across borders.”25
Andrea Sangiovanni calls such a claim “relational,” because it asserts that “the
content and scope of distributive equality” depends on “the current extent and
degree of interaction.”26
Any theory of justice that makes obligations of distributive justice
contingent on the actual degree of cooperation between parties, however,
creates a problem analogous to the immigration paradox.  If voluntary acts of
cooperation trigger obligations of distributive justice, then wealthy societies
have a reason to avoid cooperating with poor societies.  The wealthy would
seek to avoid the burdens that such obligations impose by shunning
THE IMMIGRATION PARADOX 11
  27 Id.
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“distributive justice that are grounded on the basic intuition that no one should be worse off
than anyone else through no fault of their own, whether or not they share in any practices or
institutions” as “nonrelational”).
  29 POGGE, supra note 22, at 247.
  30 Id.; see PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD 177 (2002).
  31 See POGGE, supra note 22, at 240-80; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE:
DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 264 (2006).
interactions with the poor, to the detriment of the very individuals whose
welfare we would seek to improve through those obligations.  This
“cooperation paradox” is simply a more general version of the immigration
paradox.
We can avoid the cooperation paradox only if we instead adopt a
normative criterion that is independent of all of our policy choices.  For
example, we could include a prospective party in the Rawlsian original
position in any case where cooperation with that party is feasible, regardless of
whether we are actually engaged in such cooperation.  Sangiovanni would call
such a theory of justice “nonrelational,” because its obligations do not depend
on the degree of current interaction.27  Under this approach, the mere
feasibility of cooperation should be sufficient to trigger obligations of
distributive justice.
Another nonrelational alternative would be to base the claim to distributive
justice simply on an individual’s status as a human being.  After all, place of
birth would appear to be a circumstance that Rawls should deem “arbitrary
from a moral point of view.”28  Pogge notes that nationality based on such a
circumstance “is just one further deep contingency (like genetic endowment,
race, gender, and social class), one more potential basis of institutional
inequalities that are ... present from birth.”29  “Within Rawls’s conception,”
Pogge suggests, “there is no reason to treat this case differently from the
others.”30  Thus, Pogge and others argue in favor of globalizing Rawls’s
principles of justice.31
Citing Beitz and others, Joseph Carens addresses the issue of immigration
restrictions in particular as a question of social justice using a global
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  32 Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251,
255, 272 n.8 (1987).
  33 Id. at 256.
  34 Carens, supra note 32, at 256.
  35 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000).
  36 Carens, supra note 32, at 261.
  37 Id. at 263.
  38 Id. at 270.
interpretation of Rawls’s original position.32  In seeking a justification for the
exclusion of aliens, he suggests, “we don’t want to be biased by self-interested
or partisan considerations” and instead “can take it as a basic presupposition
that we should treat all human beings, not just members of our own society, as
free and equal moral persons.”33  Carens identifies this premise as a basic
feature of all liberal political theories, concluding that we should “take a
global, not a national view of the original position.”34
If we begin with equal concern for all persons, then immigration barriers
are morally suspect and demand justification.  All immigration restrictions
discriminate against individuals based on their alienage.  Most aliens are born
aliens because our nationality laws deem them to be aliens based on
immutable characteristics, including the geographic location of their birth (that
is, national origin) and the citizenship of their parents at the time of their
birth.35  This discrimination based explicitly on circumstances of birth is at
odds with liberal ideals.  Carens concludes that we cannot justify restrictions
“on the grounds that those born in a given territory or born of parents who
were citizens were more entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born
elsewhere or of alien parents.”36  Similarly, in a utilitarian calculation of global
welfare, “current citizens would enjoy no privileged position.”37  Carens
concludes from these liberal premises that “we have an obligation to open our
borders much more fully than we do now.”38  Carens condemns our
immigration restrictions:  “Like feudal barriers to mobility, they protect unjust
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  40 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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  42 Id. at 258.
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privilege.”39  Thus, from a cosmopolitan perspective, principles of justice
require us not only to grant immigrant workers liberal access to public benefits
and to citizenship but also to grant aliens liberal access to our labor market and
to permanent residence in our territory.
Nevertheless, some liberals defend immigration restrictions and reject the
extension of our principles of distributive justice to prospective immigrants.
Critics of cosmopolitan liberalism propose various alternative theories that
limit obligations of distributive justice to members of the same national
community.  I next review the reasons advanced by these critics for more
limited theories of distributive justice and argue that these theories do not offer
a satisfactory alternative to the cosmopolitan liberalism.  I suggest instead that
the liberal ideals expressed in our declaration that “all men are created equal”40
require a cosmopolitan perspective.
A.  State Coercion 
Although Michael Blake concedes that liberalism is “committed to moral
equality, so that the simple fact of humanity is sufficient to motivate a demand
for equal concern and respect,”41 he defends “distinct principles of distributive
justice applicable only within the national context.”42  In particular, he argues
that “a concern for specifically economic egalitarianism is only morally
required within the context of a domestic legal system,”43 where “distinct
burdens of justification” apply “between individuals who share liability to the
coercive power of the state.”44  He claims that it is only in the “search for the
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justification of state coercion” that “egalitarian distributive justice becomes
relevant.”45
Although Blake seeks to distinguish the domestic context from the
international context based on the presence of state coercion, his suggestion
that we focus on state coercion does not distinguish the prospective immigrant
coerced by our immigration laws from incumbent residents.  After all, we
exclude prospective immigrants through the use or threat of force applied by
the state.  In this sense, all aliens are subject to exclusion under the
immigration laws enforced by our state, and they may demand that we justify
this coercive exclusion within a framework of equal concern and respect for
all.
Blake recognizes this problem, but asserts that “each distinct form of
coercion requires a distinct form of justification.”46  Without elaborating, he
claims that the justification that we owe to a prospective immigrant “would be
significantly different from that offered to a present member for the web of
legal coercion within which she currently lives” and that only inequality
among “current” members of our society “gives rise to a legitimate concern
for relative deprivation.”47  This limit on the justification owed the prospective
immigrant seems at odds with Blake’s broad claim that “Rawls’s ... theory of
justice might profitably be viewed as a theory by which the coercive force of
the state might be justified to free and equal persons who have a prima facie
moral entitlement to be free from all coercion.”48  Blake does not qualify this
claim based on the nature or the scope of the coercion to be justified.  Blake’s
treatment of immigration begs the question:  Why should the prospective
immigrant accept a justification for our immigration laws that does not offer
the alien the equal concern embodied in the Rawlsian original position,
including a concern for relative deprivation?
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It is unclear why we should limit our concern for relative deprivation to
those currently living within our “web of legal coercion.”  If the claim is that
prospective immigrants are burdened in only a minor way by our immigration
laws, which therefore require little justification, then this empirical claim is
questionable, given the significant harm suffered by those excluded from our
labor market.  Although prospective immigrants do not currently live under all
our laws, this fact does not diminish the coercion they suffer and the costs they
bear under our immigration laws.  This fact may change the law in question
that requires justification, but it should not change what counts as a
justification.  That is, a defense of our immigration laws must give the aliens
coerced by our state the same equal concern extended to citizens coerced by
our state, including a concern for relative deprivation.
Even if we grant Blake’s claim that one must live within our web of
coercive laws to be entitled to a concern for relative deprivation, we must
extend such concern to the unauthorized immigrant who also lives within this
web.  If we seek to deport the unauthorized immigrant as a means of enforcing
our immigration laws, for example, then the immigrant may demand that we
justify those laws in terms that reflect concern for the relative deprivation that
we impose through those laws.  This right to distributive justice may well
block deportation in the case of an immigrant excludable at the border in the
absence of such a right.
Yet it seems perverse and unfair to give the unauthorized immigrant a right
to distributive justice that we do not extend to the prospective immigrant who
obediently complies with our immigration laws.  Such a stance invites
prospective immigrants to enter illegally so that they may obtain the right to
distributive justice that we grant to immigration lawbreakers.  On the other
hand, if we cite the unauthorized immigrant’s violation of our immigration
laws as the reason to deny that immigrant a right to distributive justice, then
how are we to respond to that immigrant’s demand that we justify those
immigration laws first?  After all, we owe even criminals a justification for the
laws we invoke to punish them, and Blake agrees that “a concern for relative
deprivation” is relevant in such a demand for justification.49
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B.  Collective Self-Governance
If we deny the unauthorized immigrant a right to distributive justice in the
justification of our immigration laws, then we must be requiring something
more than simply living under our web of coercive laws to generate such a
right.  One response to this problem might be to distinguish both prospective
and unauthorized immigrants from citizens by pointing to some other feature
of citizens.  Thomas Nagel, for example, suggests that “the objection to
arbitrary inequalities” arises only among “fellow participants in a collective
enterprise of coercively imposed legal and political institutions that generates
such arbitrary inequalities.”50  He claims that “[i]t is only from such a system,
and from our fellow members through its institutions, that we can claim a right
to democracy, equal citizenship, nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity,
and the amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distribution of
social and economic goods.”51  Similarly, Stephen Macedo asserts that we
should confine “the extensive obligation of distributive justice to self-
governing and self-responsible political communities:  peoples who share a
common political life and who exercise extensive authority over one
another.”52
Like Blake, Nagel notes that a regime’s “requirements claim our active
cooperation, and this cannot be legitimately done without justification.”53  By
participation in such a collective enterprise, however, Nagel means more than
mere cooperation through obedience.  The law-abiding prospective immigrant,
after all, cooperates with us by complying with our immigration laws.  Nagel
stresses that “we are both putative joint authors of the coercively imposed
system, and subject to its norms, i.e., expected to accept their authority.”54
Prospective and unauthorized immigrants are not putative joint authors of our
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immigration laws.  Furthermore, Nagel claims, “the laws are not imposed in
their name, nor are they asked to accept and uphold those laws.”55
It is obscure, however, in what sense prospective immigrants are not
“asked to accept and uphold those laws,” given that we threaten criminal
penalties for aliens who enter illegally.56  Nagel’s claim would come as a
surprise to the unauthorized immigrant sentenced to imprisonment for
violating our immigration laws.  If we do not ask immigrants to “accept and
uphold” these laws, then why do we punish violators?  It is certainly difficult
to perceive any respect in which we do not ask aliens to “accept and uphold”
our immigration policies, given the way that we treat violators under our laws
and in our public discourse, which seems to regard unauthorized immigrants
simply as lawbreakers deserving of punishment.
Furthermore, Nagel’s observation that our immigration laws “are not
imposed in their name” merely begs the question of whether we should instead
impose immigration laws that we can justify in the name of all those affected.
His observation provides no persuasive defense for immigration laws that are
too restrictive to be justified in such terms.  If Nagel intends to cite our failure
to give equal consideration to the interests of prospective immigrants as a
defense for immigration laws that fail to give their interests equal
consideration, then his reasoning would seem to prove too much.
Consider a society that permits slavery.  Suppose it seeks to defend its laws
by noting that the slaves do not participate in that society’s collective
enterprise of self-governance and are thus not “putative joint authors of the
coercively imposed system,” adding that “the laws are not imposed in their
name.”  We would not find this proposed justification persuasive, precisely
because the very fact that the laws exclude them from participation and are not
imposed in their name is a reason to deem them unjust.  Thus, a person’s
participation in the collective enterprise of self-governance as a putative joint
author of the “coercively imposed system” cannot be a necessary condition for
that person’s right to distributive justice in that system.  Therefore, it would
not be an adequate defense of guest-worker programs, for example, to declare
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that guest workers are not putative joint authors of the “coercively imposed
system.”
If we reject the proposed defense of slavery on the ground that the
exclusion of slaves from political participation and from the sphere of equal
concern is unjust and a violation of human rights, then we beg the question of
whether restrictive immigration laws are also unjust because they exclude both
prospective and unauthorized immigrants from full participation in our
society.  Before we cite participation in self-governance as a basis for the right
to distributive justice, we must first demonstrate that the restrictions we
impose on this participation, including immigration restrictions, are
themselves justified.  The implicit assumption is that we are justified in
discounting the welfare of prospective immigrants when we formulate our
immigration laws.57  This proposed justification for our immigration laws
would suffer from circular reasoning if it ultimately relies on an assumption
that these laws are just.
C.  Reciprocity
In an effort to avoid such objections to Nagel’s theory, Sangiovanni
attempts to defend obligations of distributive justice that are limited to
residents of the same state without requiring “the ‘state’ (or for that matter any
of its officials) taking a certain kind of attitude toward us.”58  For Sangiovanni,
what matters instead is “reciprocity among those who support and maintain
the state’s capacity to provide the basic collective goods necessary to protect
us from physical attack and to maintain ... a stable system of property
rights.”59  This reciprocity applies among “citizens and residents” of a state,
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who “maintain the state through taxation, through participation in ... political
activity, and through simple compliance” with the state’s laws.60
This theory of reciprocity, however, does not provide much of a defense of
restrictive immigration laws.  Like Blake’s theory based on coercion, a theory
based on reciprocity does not distinguish the unauthorized immigrant from the
slave as residents entitled to distributive justice.  After all, laws can exclude
both residents from the electorate and thus from voting, one form of political
participation.  The unauthorized immigrant may pay taxes and generally obey
most laws, as other residents do.  Most residents, after all, will violate some
laws, such as speed limits.  Furthermore, even the law-abiding prospective
immigrant supports the state through compliance with the state’s immigration
laws.  Do these forms of support for the state allow unauthorized or
prospective immigrants to raise objections to the relative deprivation imposed
on them by the state’s immigration laws?  If not, then why not?
Ultimately, Sangiovanni does not offer a persuasive reason to limit the
requirements imposed by “equality as a demand of justice” to “fellow citizens
or residents.”61  He asserts that the parties behind the Rawlsian “veil of
ignorance should be citizens and residents,” because “those who have
submitted themselves to a system of laws and social rules in ways necessary to
sustain our life as citizens, producers, and biological beings are owed a fair
return for what those who have benefitted from their submission have
received.”62  If this logic is the rationale for inclusion in the Rawlsian original
position, however, then why not include the aliens abroad who sustain the
status quo through their compliance with our immigration laws?  Those aliens
would be making as much of a contribution as citizens who “are able but
unwilling to work,” who Sangiovanni says are “contributing to the
maintenance of the state” as long as “they continue to comply with the laws”
and “continue to pay taxes, assuming they have any to pay.”63  One could say
the same of aliens abroad who comply with our immigration laws and owe us
no taxes.
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Indeed, if the basis for the egalitarian claim to distributive justice is the
way in which anyone’s enjoyment of “social advantages” inevitably “depends
on the contributions of others,”64 as Sangiovanni suggests, then why not
include everyone who participates in the world economy and thereby
contributes to our affluence?  Why privilege those who happen to contribute to
our affluence by supporting our state?  Sangiovanni asserts that this type of
contribution is “more fundamental than mutual contribution to economic
production,”65 but his assertion begs the question:  Why should the form of the
contribution rather than the magnitude of the contribution matter?  After all,
an alien abroad who supplies a resource essential to our standard of living
(like oil, for example) may make a greater contribution to our affluence than a
relatively unskilled citizen who pays little in taxes.  Why should the citizen
who contributes less have a greater claim to distributive justice than the alien
abroad who contributes more?
D.  Involuntary Residence
We might distinguish all immigrants from natives on the ground that they
seek to associate with us voluntarily whereas natives are born into our society
and have no choice.  Nagel, for example, stresses “the contingency of
involuntary rather than voluntary association,” claiming that “[a]n institution
that one has no choice about joining must offer terms of membership that meet
a higher standard” than voluntary associations.66  Similarly, Joseph Heath
notes that “being born into society is a circumstance, while moving into one is
a choice,”67 arguing that “involuntarily incurred obligations must meet a much
higher standard in order to be considered binding.”68  In particular, Heath
claims that “[t]he conditions under which immigrants secure admittance ... are
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not involuntary,” and therefore, “the strict criterion of equality ... need not
apply.”69
This distinction would allow us to justify not only laws discriminating
against unauthorized or prospective immigrants but also nativist laws that fail
to extend equal concern to legal immigrants after admission.  This nativist
theory of distributive justice favors the interests of natives and discounts the
interests of immigrants.  Like the cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice,
this nativist theory can provide a normative criterion that is independent of our
admission policies and thus avoids the circularity that underlies the
immigration paradox.  As we saw, this nativist perspective suggests guest-
worker programs as the optimal immigration policies for relatively unskilled
aliens.
The welfare objective that is consistent with liberal ideals, however, is
cosmopolitan rather than nativist.  The nativist theory turns liberalism on its
head insofar as it entitles natives in rich countries to advantages based on
immutable circumstances of birth.  “We do not deserve to have been born into
a particular society any more than we deserve to have been born into a
particular family,” Nagel concedes, yet he maintains that only natives enjoy a
presumption against arbitrary inequality, “so an arbitrary distinction is
responsible for the scope of the presumption against arbitrariness.”70  This
suggestion seems to fly in the face of reality when those born in rich countries
cite the circumstances of their birth as if it were some sort of disadvantage
justifying privileges not extended to those born in poor countries who seek to
move “voluntarily” into those rich countries.  After all, those born into poor
countries involuntarily incur poverty and the legal obligation to comply with
the immigration laws of rich countries.  Given those realities, why not impose
the same standard of distributive justice to bind prospective immigrants under
our immigration laws as we apply to natives under other laws?  A view more
sensitive to social, legal, and economic realities would recognize the claims of
prospective immigrants based on all the burdens they have involuntarily
incurred.
The claims advanced by Nagel and Heath assume that natives are not free
to emigrate and therefore reside involuntarily in their country of origin.  They
may base their assumption on a realistic evaluation of the feasibility of
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emigration under current conditions.  Insofar as they base this assumption on
the immigration barriers raised by other countries, however, they make our
right to distributive justice curiously contingent on the immigration policies of
other countries.  If another country opens its borders to some, most, or all
prospective migrants from our country, do those who are free to emigrate
thereby become voluntary residents who are therefore not entitled to
distributive justice?
Nagel and Heath may invoke not only legal barriers to migration but also
those barriers raised in practice by the social or economic costs of migration
for the individual migrant.  Heath, for example, suggests that “the costs
associated with emigration are so high that nationality is de facto involuntary,”
conceding that “the distinction between voluntary and involuntary is
determined by some notion of which options an individual could reasonably
be expected to exercise.”71  Often, however, these costs are quite low, as when
a native of the United States contemplates migration to Canada, or when a
native of Australia contemplates migration to New Zealand.  If such
emigration is quite easy for the native, then does this option undermine that
native’s claim to distributive justice?  Furthermore, once we recognize that the
difference between “involuntary” residence and “voluntary” migration is not
only a matter of degree but also a question of what options we should deem
“reasonable,” then the claims advanced by Nagel and Heath beg the question:
Should we regard residence in a poor country to be so costly as to make it
unreasonable for us to expect the prospective migrant to refrain from
migration to a rich country?
E.  The Absence of a Cosmopolitan State
Macedo rejects claims of cosmopolitan distributive justice, finding it “hard
to understand the reasonableness of making people responsible for the welfare
of others without also making them responsible for their governance.”72
“Cosmopolitan distributive justice,” he concludes, “makes no sense absent a
cosmopolitan state.”73  Even if we assume that the absence of a cosmopolitan
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state implies some limits on obligations of distributive justice, however, this
absence would not justify immigration restrictions that neglect principles of
global distributive justice.74  After all, the admission of any given set of
immigrants would make us “responsible for their governance” as well as
responsible for their welfare.  Upon joining our society, the immigrant could
agree to the same terms of the social contract as the native born into our
society.  Why should our inability to govern them prior to admission justify
our failure to consider their welfare in the admission decision, as long as we
can govern them after admission?
Perhaps the concern is that immigrants may not have paid their fair share
of tax revenues and could thereby unfairly exploit the public treasury in the
country of immigration.  Heath, for example, worries that “if states lifted
immigration controls in the current global context, they would open
themselves up to a variety of forms of harmful predation.”75  “No welfare state
could survive,” he notes, “if people chose to spend their childhood and
retirement in a welfare state, yet their working lives in a low-taxation state
with minimal public services.”76  These concerns, however, only justify policy
responses tailored to those specific concerns, not general restrictions on
immigration.  We might address such concerns, for example, with fiscal
policies that impose appropriate conditions on immigration.  To ensure that
immigrants do not unfairly drain the public treasury, we might restrict the
access that immigrants enjoy to the particular public entitlements raising such
concerns, for example, or impose special taxes on immigrants as a form of
admission fee in appropriate cases.  These policies would be less restrictive
than immigration restrictions that exclude the prospective immigrant from our
country entirely and thereby needlessly destroy gains from trade in the labor
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market.  More important, any such concern would seem to raise questions only
regarding the particular policies that could be justified within a framework of
equal concern.  Fiscal concerns would not seem to provide much of a reason to
question the basic premise that any law is morally justified only if its rationale
extends equal concern to all those affected, including a concern for relative
deprivation.
We might say the same regarding suggestions that liberal immigration
policies would pose various other problems.  For example, Heath worries
about the possibility that liberal immigration would undermine the incentives
for “the provision of public goods for future generations, by such measures as
encouraging a high rate of savings, controlling public debt, preventing long-
term environmental degradation, [and] implementing population control
measures.”77 Rawls expresses similar concerns, worrying that people may be
tempted to “make up for their irresponsibility in caring for their land and its
natural resources ... by migrating into other people’s territory.”78  If Heath and
Rawls are worried about the incentives to invest in local public goods in
countries of emigration, then two considerations suggest that their concerns
provide little support for immigration restrictions.
First, we should recognize that it is entirely appropriate for a country of
emigration to take future emigration into account in deciding how much to
invest in local public goods.  Insofar as emigration implies a smaller
population in the future than would otherwise exist, the benefits derived from
a local public good will be smaller, and a reduced investment in such a good
would be socially optimal.  A legitimate concern arises only if the prospect of
future emigration leads some residents in the country of emigration to
withdraw support for even this optimal level of investment because they
anticipate their own future emigration.
Second, even if the prospect of emigration distorts investment below the
optimal level, there are probably better policy responses available to the
country of immigration than immigration restrictions.  If the country of
immigration is actually concerned about local public goods in countries of
emigration, then the country of immigration can always use its jurisdiction
over immigrants to collect tax revenue from them to finance subsidies for
investments in public goods in countries of emigration.  Such subsidies would
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be better than the exclusion of prospective immigrants insofar as a policy of
exclusion needlessly destroys gains from trade in the labor market.
Heath may also be worried about incentives to invest in public goods in the
country of immigration.  Immigrants may congest local public goods and
thereby reduce the return that natives enjoy on their investment in these public
goods.  Again, these concerns arise even within a framework of distributive
justice for all, and we could address these concerns through measures more
narrowly tailored than general immigration restrictions.  We could, for
example, charge immigrants an appropriate fee for access to any public good
subject to congestion without imposing other immigration restrictions.  Such
fees can internalize negative externalities from immigration, deter inefficient
immigration, and compensate natives for any congestion of local public goods
arising from immigration.  We can weigh all of these concerns against the
claims of the immigrant in deciding what policy responses are appropriate.
After all, similar concerns also arise within a society in the absence of any
international migration.  We may worry that redistribution from the rich to the
poor, for example, undermines the incentives of poor families to save or to
have fewer children.  I do not deny that analogous problems may arise with
liberal immigration policies.  My only claim is that our policy response to
these concerns in the immigration context should extend equal concern to all
those affected, just as our policy response to similar concerns in the domestic
context should be based on equal concern.  If we understand in the domestic
context that it is unfair for a native born into a large and poor family to suffer
as a result of circumstances beyond that person’s control, for example, then we
should also understand in the immigration context that it is unfair for an alien
born into a poor and populous country to suffer as a result of similar
circumstances.  I have suggested that the attempts by some liberal theorists
and philosophers to distinguish immigration policies from laws in the
domestic context in this regard are all ultimately question-begging.
III.  POLITICAL FEASIBILITY AND THE SECOND BEST
I have suggested that liberal ideals require a global view of distributive
justice, and I have outlined critiques of some of the alternative conceptions of
justice advanced by critics of this cosmopolitan perspective.  I conclude that
considerations of global justice militate in favor of liberalized migration.
Considerations of justice suggest that liberal states should seek to liberalize
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their immigration policies, thereby reducing global inequalities in economic
opportunity.  It is incumbent upon liberal states to pursue such liberalizing
reforms if they are to remain faithful to the egalitarian ideals that they espouse.
Given the failure of most citizens to adopt this cosmopolitan perspective,
however, cosmopolitan liberals face a constraint of political feasibility that
prevents realization of all their ideals.  As a matter of political reality, the
interests of citizens have in fact played a dominant role in the public debate
over immigration policies.  National governments, including that of the United
States, will likely continue to deem the promotion of the interests of its own
citizens to be the paramount objective of its immigration policies.  This feature
of the real world may impose a constraint on the set of policy alternatives open
to us as a practical matter.
The cosmopolitan liberal would prefer that aliens have access to both our
labor market and ready access to public benefits and to citizenship.  As a
matter of political reality, however, incumbent citizens are unlikely to admit
relatively unskilled aliens under those generous conditions in the numbers that
cosmopolitan ideals would require, given the fiscal burden that those liberal
policies would entail.  As long as citizens are limited in their willingness to
bear this burden, they are likely to restrict alien access to immigrant visas.
The self-interest of citizens is bound to impose constraints of political
feasibility on the availability of immigrant visas.  These constraints are likely
to exclude many relatively unskilled aliens from labor markets in wealthy
countries unless these aliens are willing to immigrate illegally or have access
to guest-worker visas.  Given these constraints, cosmopolitan liberals face a
trade-off:  significantly liberalized access to our labor markets for relatively
unskilled alien workers will likely require some restrictions on access to
public benefits and citizenship to have a realistic chance of enactment.79
Under these circumstances, guest-worker programs may represent the only
alternative to exclusion for many aliens.
If so, then cosmopolitan liberals must settle for second-best policies that
fall short of their ideals.  For many relatively unskilled alien workers, guest-
worker programs may be the best one can achieve under current
circumstances.  These programs may be incompatible with liberal ideals, but
as Carens and others have argued, the exclusion of aliens is also incompatible
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with these ideals.  If political realities require us to choose between these two
departures from our liberal ideals, then how can we justify the choice that
inflicts the greater harm on the alien as well as on natives?  Exclusion is the
more costly response for both natives and aliens, because it excludes aliens not
only from our public benefits but also from our labor market and thereby
sacrifices the gains that we and they would otherwise derive from trade in that
market.
James Woodward notes that if we act against a “background of non-ideal
institutions and behaviour” in a world “in which large numbers of people and
institutions fail to do what justice requires,” we may “acquire obligations
which are different from those [we] would acquire under more perfectly just
institutional arrangements.”80  As Woodward states the theory of the second
best:
It is not in general a defensible moral principle that if it is obligatory (or
even a good thing) to do P under ideal, utopian circumstances, then it is
also obligatory (or even a good thing) to do P under the actual
circumstances, no matter how far they may differ from the ideal.81
Woodward advances this claim in defense of immigration restrictions, but as
we have seen, they could more plausibly justify restrictions on alien access to
public benefits and to citizenship.  Indeed, Woodward himself notes that “it is
far from obvious that it would be wrong ... to limit eligibility for social welfare
programmes to citizens or long-term residents, if failure to do so would
jeopardize the continued existence of such programmes.”82  We might say the
same about restrictions on alien access to public benefits and citizenship if
these restrictions are necessary to make politically feasible the alien’s access
to our labor market and the alien’s admission in the first place.
These second-best arguments require us to rank two non-ideal alternatives,
both of which fall short of our moral ideals.  If we seek to maximize an
appropriate measure of global economic welfare, taking not only global wealth
but also its distribution into account, then a guest-worker program represents
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the lesser of two evils when compared with the alternative of exclusion.
Exclusion not only decreases global wealth but also worsens its distribution,
whereas a guest-worker program would improve social welfare on both counts
by increasing labor mobility.83
In this sense, from a consequentialist perspective that extends equal
concern to aliens and natives, expanded guest-worker programs represent an
improvement over the status quo alternative of exclusion.  Therefore, I
suggest, cosmopolitan liberals should support liberalizing reforms that include
guest-worker programs, even while seeking the broadest rights possible for
aliens within the constraints of political feasibility.84  While it would be a
mistake to pretend that this compromise is ideal from a liberal perspective, it
would also be a mistake to sacrifice worthwhile reforms because they fall
short of the ideal.
